As a fresh and rookie member of DRCO, the Dutch DARES-derivate and equivalent in the province of Zeeland, The Netherlands, It was my time to host this month’s training exercise.

DRCO is an abbreviation for Delta Radio Communicatie Ondersteuning, which translates to “Delta-region Radio Comms Support” Whereas the Delta-region comprises of mostly Zeeland in The Netherlands.

So what does DRCO do? Actually just what (D)ARES does, but more lightweight, more agile and more regionally tied (‘Delta’, or Zeeland). It tries to set up radio EMCOM (emergency communications) between important poi’s and government bodies in case of regional internet and cellular outage.

Whereas the military and other civil services need time (often up to 72 hours) to set up emergency comms, DRCO and ARES-type of groups in general are able to establish radio comms between government bodies within the first few hours after a regional outage. And that’s exactly where DRCO fills the gap between an outage incident and the government’s contingency, which can take multiple days to set up.

Nowadays, with Starlink satcom possibilities and a robust network of cellular connectivity with built-in redundancy, the chance where DRCO needs to act is slim. It’s not like 1953 any more, where the Watersnoodramp (Dutch flood of 1953) posed extreme hurdles for communications between rescue teams and government bodies. Nowadays, a Starlink satellite dish pulled out of a waterproof pelicase can be connected and secure, broadband comms will be up within 30 minutes. Glass-fiber will mostly still be functioning and cell-phone antennas will hold on for a little while, because of their redudancy battery, that provides power for hours more after a grid-down situation.

So, why DRCO in 2026?

For me there are two valid reasons to have DRCO-like groups still existing:

• A great way to participate in low-entry EMCOM exercises
• Radio is the only way to establish fast point to point connections without third parties

While probably never needed in real-life situations, groups like DRCO or ARES can share valuable skills and knowledge about communications in general. Because of participating in training scene’s (actually larping a simulated grid-down event where EMCOM needs to be established) you find out really quicky what becomes important during communications when only radio is available. Limitations in range, preventing chaos, readability of information, security of information, the availability of radio technology at scene, etc. All of these come together during these exercises. The bottleneck will become visible, whether it’s usable range of used equipment, improper dispatching resulting in chaos or sloppy information integrity; it will come to light during an exercise, where the clock is ticking.

The other point is that radio is the only way to establish fast point-to-point connections, without the need of third parties. It will perhaps not come to mind to a lot of people, but the fact that Starlink satellites and cellphone towers exist and are generally considered reliable in case of emergency, does not guarantee that the third parties controlling them are reliable at all times. A government or a company, involved in providing the service, albeit satellite or cellular coverage, might become compromised really really fast during grid-down situations and the following civil unrest that might follow. Self-interests are on the rise and that might involve that a decision is made to not provide EMCOM possibilities to the public any longer or only in a way that allows for monitoring or handling by compromised agencies or actors, which can become extremely dangerous in a volatile environment where the rule of law became just random words in some books, instead of an agreed upon social contract enforced by judges. Being able to use simplex radio comms during such situations can be valuable in my opinion. While groups like DRCO are initially meant for EMCOM in addition to and in collaboration with state owned contingency comms, it’s perfectly usable as a stand-alone separate comms system, in cases where the state or third parties controlling regular comms have been compromised.

For me personally it was a fun time to host last exercise. I’ve learnt a lot by planning and executing it. It’s a great way to see radio equipment, antenna placement, radio etiquette, role assignment and information integrity come together and see where things start to fall apart by doing so and try to improve on that for the next exercise.

If you like what you just read, please pay them a visit: https://drco.nl/ (Dutch)